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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 25, 1999, Austrian police arrested the Bosnian
Serb Army's chief of staff, General Momir Talic. He was ar-
rested in Austria while he was attending a conference organized
by the Vienna National Defense Academy and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe.1 He was charged in a
secret indictment issued by the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 ("International Yugoslavia
Tribunal" or "Tribunal"), with "persecuting civilians 'on politi-
cal, racial, or religious grounds."' 2 Although the method which
the tribunal used to arrest General Talic, including the element
1 See generally Marlise Simons, Top Bosnian Serb Officer Arrested for U.N.
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, August 26, 1999, at A10.
2 Id.
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of secrecy surrounding the indictment and trickery shrouding
his invitation to the conference in Vienna, might seem suspect
to some, it was completely legal and in accordance with both
United States law and international law.
The Tribunal has had difficulty in apprehending many sus-
pected war criminals. 3 This is due in great part to the interna-
tional community's "unwillingness to actively search for and
arrest war criminals within Yugoslavia." 4 Common sense sug-
gests that public indictments tend to warn suspected war
criminals allowing them to evade arrest and prosecution. The
Tribunal realized that it could solve this conundrum by ceasing
to release indictments since an "apprehension will be ... facili-
tated if the target is unsuspecting."5
Secrecy facilitated the arrest of General Talic. Seemingly
ignorant of his indicted status in the international community,
General Talic left Bosnia to attend a conference held in Aus-
tria.6 An informant alerted the Tribunal to General Talic's in-
tention to attend, and the Tribunal quickly delivered a warrant
for his arrest, as well as a copy of his indictment, to the Vien-
nese police.7 This was the United Nation's first arrest of such a
prominent suspected war criminal.8
The Tribunal's technique, of secretly indicting suspected
war criminals and then waiting for them to be lured out of their
safe-havens into a country in which the Tribunal can assert ju-
risdiction over them, might appear, at first, to be a questionable
reaction to the international community's frustrating inability
to apprehend these individuals. It does not seem fair that a
suspect is denied the knowledge that he is indeed a suspect and,
thus, denied the opportunity to defend himself, by offering evi-
dence or testimony. Furthermore, the fact that General Talic
was invited to attend what could be considered a peace confer-
ence could be seen to reek of deception and trickery. Are the
Tribunal's secret indictments, although successful and techni-
3 See Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 38 (1999).
4 See Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., In Search of Peace and Justice: War Criminals
at Large in the Former Yugoslavia, 32 INT'L LAw. 489, 489-90 (1998).
5 Arbour, supra note 3, at 39.
6 See Simons, supra note 1.
7 See id.
8 See id.
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cally respectful of the United Nations' sensibilities, acceptable
to the international community in general? Do secret indict-
ments agree with the United States' indictment procedures?
Does the Tribunal's method of acquiring jurisdiction accord
with the international community's approach to jurisdiction or
that held by the United States? The first section of this com-
ment will investigate whether secret indictment procedures and
secret indictments are acceptable under United States law. The
second part of this comment will discuss whether international
law supports the use of such tactics. The third part of this com-
ment will consider what methods United States law condones
for the acquisition of jurisdiction over indictees, while the final
section will discuss what approach international law takes
when considering the legality of methods for the acquisition of
jurisdiction.
It appears that the use of these practices does not contra-
dict international law or United States law. In the United
States a judge can order that an indictment be sealed for sev-
eral reasons, not the least of which, is to facilitate the apprehen-
sion of those suspects mentioned in the indictment who are not
already in custody.9 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence that
govern the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia expressly allow
for the sealing of indictments where such a measure is neces-
sary to apprehend suspects. 10
Furthermore, it is a well-accepted principle throughout
courts in the United States that the method by which a person
is brought into a jurisdiction does not affect the court's jurisdic-
tion over the person as long as he or she is given a fair trial."
Although most of the international community does not share
the United States' lack of concern over the manner in which ju-
risdiction over a suspect is obtained, most would support the
Tribunal's jurisdiction in this case due to the stature of this par-
9 See United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 320 (10th Cir. 1973).
10 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U. N. Doc.
IT/ 32/Rev. 18 (July 14, 2000), Rule 53, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 484, 516 (1994),
available at icty/basic/rpe/IT32_revl8con.htm [hereinafter ICTY Rules of
Procedure].
11 See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521-22 (1952).
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ticular suspect. 12 As common sense might suggest, merely be-
cause a practice is legal does not mean it is just or wise. It must
be questioned whether the practice of secretly indicting sus-
pected war criminals and inviting them to attend conferences or
other international forums where they are then arrested could
have unpalatable results.
II. THE INTEGRAL AND LONG-STANDING USE OF SECRET
INDICTMENTS IN UNITED STATES LAW
Regardless of the results that the practice of secretly in-
dicting war criminals may have on future peace talks, it re-
mains a fact that United States law allows indictments to be
kept secret. 13 Courts throughout the United States frequently
seal indictments.14 Secrecy is one of the major characteristics of
grand jury proceedings from which indictments arise 15 and one
that has withstood the test of time.16 Federal grand jury delib-
erations and hearings are conducted in secrecy.1 7 According to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States Dis-
trict Courts,
a grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a re-
cording device, a typist who transcribes record for testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is
made . . . shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury... A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a con-
tempt of court.1 8
This prohibition covers the disclosure of any and all information
that may expose what occurred before this body.19 Very limited
exceptions to this secrecy rule exist. Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts, Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(i), states that, it is permissible for disclosure to be
12 See generally Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction Over Persons
Abducted in Violation Of International Law in the Aftermath of United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 5 U. CHI. L SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205 (1998).
13 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(E)(4).
14 See United States v. Richard, 943 F.2d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 1991).
15 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
16 See United States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
17 See Barnett v. Dillon, 890 F. Supp. 83, 88 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
18 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(E)(2).
19 See United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 458 F. Supp.784, 790 (W.D. Mo.
1978).
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made to "[a]ttorney[s] for the government for the use in the per-
formance of such attorney's duty."20 According to the Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(iii), it is also acceptable for government lawyers to
share information about occurrences in one grand jury with an-
other grand jury.21 These exceptions, however, cannot be exer-
cised without a very strong showing that the information
sought to be disclosed is indeed critical to the party seeking its
disclosure. 22
This strict secrecy is essential for the proper functioning of
the grand jury and, therefore, should be carefully enforced. 23
Strict secrecy is necessary for many different reasons. 24 If these
proceedings were made public, many people would cease volun-
teering information for fear of retaliation. 25 Moreover, the reli-
ability of information gathered from witnesses appearing before
the grand jury might also be seriously affected by their fear of
retribution. 26 Furthermore, if grand jury proceedings were
made public, knowledge of the proceeding might facilitate sus-
pects' tampering with witnesses and members of the grand jury,
or cause suspects to flee outside of the courts' jurisdiction,
avoiding indictment.27 In addition, secrecy protects the reputa-
tions of unindicted suspects. 28 Once the proceedings have fin-
ished, the record may be disclosed, when necessary, for the
furtherance of justice.29 The shroud of secrecy that protects
grand jury proceedings in progress does not automatically ex-
tend over to indictments that may be produced by this body.
30
Disclosure of grand jury proceedings can even be made to the
defendant himself if deemed necessary by the court.
3 1
20 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i).
21 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii).
22 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 942 F.2d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1991).
23 See Armco Steel Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 790.
24 See generally Douglas Oil Company v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211
(1979).
25 See United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628 (3rd Cir. 1954).
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
30 See United States v. Ahmad, 329 F. Supp. 292, 298 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
31 See United States v. Badger Paper Mills, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Wis.
1965).
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Although grand jury proceedings and the indictments that
may be issued may be made public, disclosure does not have to
occur. According to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, "[r]ecords, orders and sub-
poenas relating to grand jury proceedings shall be kept under
seal to the extent and for such time as necessary to prevent dis-
closure of matters occurring before a grand jury. '32 An indict-
ment may also be sealed.33 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts state that the
Federal Magistrate to whom an indictment is returned may di-
rect that the indictment is kept secret until the defendant is in
custody or has been released pending trial. Furthermore, an in-
dictment may be sealed "[flor any legitimate prosecutorial ob-
jective or where the public interest otherwise requires it". 34
Many United States courts have cited the concern that the de-
fendant might flee, as a reason for keeping an indictment secret
after it is issued. 35 These courts have determined that the gov-
ernment has reasonable prosecutorial need to apprehend indict-
ees. 36 In order to facilitate the arrest of such persons, the
government must request that the court seal the indictment.37
An indictment can also be sealed in order to facilitate the appre-
hension of a defendant who is not within the jurisdiction of the
court at the time the indictment is issued and whose expected
return to the jurisdiction would not occur if he became aware of
the existence of the indictment. 38
III. THE DEVELOPING ACCEPTANCE AND USE OF SECRET
INDICTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
There are no standardized rules of procedure in interna-
tional law. Thus, there are no clear documents that can be re-
ferred to in a discussion of whether international law condones
the use of secret indictment procedures and/or secret indict-
32 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(E)(6).
33 See United States v. Richard, 943 F.2d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 1991).
34 United States v. Lakin, 874 F.2d 168, 170-71 (8th Cir. 1989).
35 See United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 320 (10th Cir. 1973).
36 See United States v. Davis, 598 F. Supp. 453, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
37 See id.
38 See id.
[Vol. 13:233
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol13/iss1/8
BY WHAT MEANS JUSTICE?
ments. 39 A review of international documents suggests that the
use of secret indictment procedures and/or secret indictments
may be acceptable to the international community. Article 16 of
the London Charter,40 which set forth the rules of procedure
and evidence applicable to be used in Germany after World War
II, suggests that secret indictment procedures and secret indict-
ments might have been acceptable to the international commu-
nity at the time. Under its terms "[a] copy of the indictment
and all the documents lodged with the indictment ... shall be
furnished to the defendant at a reasonable time before the
trial."41 This article leaves open the possibility that secret in-
dictments and sealed indictments would have been acceptable
under the phrase "a reasonable time before trial."42 A grand
jury type of proceeding and any subsequent indictment arising
from such a proceeding could have been kept secret from an in-
dictee for any legitimate judicial purpose as long as he was in-
formed of its content while he still had enough time before trial
to prepare a defense against the charges contained in the indict-
ment. Since the rules were "essentially devised by Americans
and based on American law"43 this supposition is quite
reasonable.
Article 17 of the United Nations Security Council's Resolu-
tion 955 Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda
(Rwanda Resolution) describes the proper procedure for the in-
vestigation and preparation of an indictment for that tribu-
nal.44 According to Article 17:
1. The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio or on the
basis of information obtained from any source... The Prosecu-
tor shall assess the information received or obtained and de-
cide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed.
39 See Evan J. Wallach , The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-
World War II War Crimes Trials: Did They Provide an Outline for International
Legal Procedure?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. 851, 882 (1999).
40 London Agreement of August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 15500, available at
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm [hereinafter London
Agreement].
41 See id. at art. 16(a).
42 Id.
43 Wallach, supra note 39, at 853.
44 See Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the International Tribu-
nal for Rwanda, November 1994, S.C. Res. 955, 49 U. N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598. [hereinafter ICTR Resolution].
2001]
7
PACE INT'L L. REV.
2. The Prosecutor shall have the power to question suspects, vic-
tims and witnesses...
3. If questioned, the suspect shall be entitled to counsel of his or
her own choice...
4. Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the Prose-
cutor shall prepare an indictment... The indictment shall be
transmitted to a judge of the Trial chamber. 45
This article fails to mention whether or not the determination of
whether a suspect should be indicted is to be held se-
cret.46Article 18 of that same resolution describes the proper re-
view of the indictment. Under this Article, "the judge of the
Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has been transmitted
shall review it [and] [u]pon confirmation of an indictment, the
judge may ... issue such orders for the arrest, detention, sur-
render or transfer of persons . . ."47 Article 18 does not clarify
whether an order to seal an indictment would be acceptable
under the powers granted to the presiding judge.48
Article 19 describes the commencement and conduct of trial
proceedings. 49 According to this article, "[a] person against
whom an indictment has been confirmed shall, pursuant to an
order or arrest warrant of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, be taken into custody, [and] immediately informed of
the charges against him or her .... ."50 Article 19 only stipulates
that the indictee be informed of the substance of the indictment
upon arrest.51
It appears that a war criminal could be secretly indicted
under the terms of Article 17 and that his indictment could be
sealed under Article 18 and Article 19. The failure of Resolu-
tion 955 to clearly address the issue of secret indictments or se-
cret indictment procedures allows for the argument that such
indictments and procedures might be acceptable to, or at least,
not in direct contradiction to, the terms of this resolution.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 ICTR Resolution, supra note 44.
51 See id.
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The actual use of secret indictments, and secret indictment
procedures, to facilitate arrests in Rwanda 52 supports this argu-
ment. The fact that these techniques were used there, and that
their use received very little attention from the international
community, 53 suggests the international community is willing
to accept secret indictments as legitimate judicial practices.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also
does not explicitly address the acceptability of secret indict-
ments or stipulate whether the process that gives rise to indict-
ments on the international level must, or even can, be held in
secret.54 The terms set forth and language used in Article 54,
which addresses the duty and powers of the Prosecutor with re-
spect to investigations, and Article 57, which addresses the
functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber, however, sug-
gest that the use of secret indictment procedures and sealed in-
dictments would be acceptable under this statute.55 According
to Article 54:
(A) The prosecutor shall: (b) take appropriate measures to ensure
the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court [and]...
(B) The prosecutor may: (e) agree not to disclose, at any stage of
the proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecu-
tor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for
the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider
of the information consents; and (f) take necessary steps, or
request that necessary measures be taken, to ensure the con-
fidentiality of information, the protection of any person or the
preservation of evidence.56
Article 57 further states:
3. In addition to its other functions under this Statute, the
Pre-Trial Chamber may: (c) [w]here necessary, provide for
the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the
52 See Arbour, supra note 3, at 37, 41.
53 See id.
54 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (September 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http:ll
www.un.org/law/icc/.
55 See id. at art. 57.
56 Id. at art. 54.
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preservation of evidence.., and the protection of national
security information. 57
Procedures that may result in an indictment that are held
in secret, as well as sealed indictments, protect witnesses, evi-
dence, and the confidentiality of information. They also serve to
ensure the privacy of witnesses. It would stand to reason that
they might be acceptable under the terms of the Rome Statute
as long as the indictee, once arrested, is "informed promptly and
in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge .... "in
accordance with Article 67 of the same statute.58
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International
Yugoslavia Tribunal directly address the propriety of secret in-
dictments and make certain statements which could be used in
support of secret indictment procedures. Under Rule 52 of
these rules, "[u]pon confirmation by a Judge of a Trial Cham-
ber, the indictment shall be made public."59 It appears from
this rule that it is standard practice for indictments to be made
public. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Rule 53 de-
scribes the circumstances in which non-disclosure of an indict-
ment may be permitted.60 Rule 53 states:
(A) When confirming an indictment the judge may, in consulta-
tion with the Prosecutor, order that there be no public disclo-
sure of the indictment until it is served on the accused, or, in
the case of joint accused, on all the accused.
(B) A Judge or Trial Chamber may, in consultation with the Pros-
ecutor, also order that there be no public disclosure of an in-
dictment, or part thereof, or of any particular document or
information, if satisfied that the making of such an order is in
the interests of justice. 61
The existence of Rule 53 and its acceptance of secret indict-
ments make clear that secret indictment procedures could take
place under the terms of this statute.
Since common sense suggests that sealing an indictment
would accomplish very little if the indictment procedure had
been conducted publicly, it can be assumed that Rule 26 implies
57 Id. at art. 57.
58 Id. at art. 67.
59 ICTY Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, at Rule 52.
60 See id. at Rule 53.
61 Id. at Rule 53.
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an acceptance of secret indictment proceedings. This assump-
tion is supported by other parts of these rules of Procedure and
Evidence for the International Yugoslavia Tribunal. According
to rule 39, which describes the conduct of investigations:
In the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor may: (ii) under-
take ... matters as may appear necessary for completing the in-
vestigation and the preparation and conduct of the prosecution at
the trial; [and] (iv) request such orders as may be necessary from a
Trial Chamber or a Judge.62
This language suggests that indictment procedures could be
held in secret if this was deemed necessary for completing the
investigation. Such might be the case if there was cause to
worry that knowledge of an indictment procedure could cause
suspects to destroy evidence or harm witnesses necessary for
completing the investigation.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (hereinafter ICTY) has, in fact, begun to exercise the op-
tion of keeping indictments sealed accorded to them by Rule
53.63 Since 1997, the ICTY has begun to use secret indictments
almost exclusively. 64 The ICTY's reliance on secret indictments
was to avoid a continued failure to arrest indictees. 65 The ICTY
formerly used public indictments, but this proved problem-
atic.66 Many indictees who had been publicly indicted would
flee to avoid arrest and prosecution. 67 Louise Arbour, the
ICTY's former chief prosecutor,68 admitted that the ICTY had
begun to use secret indictments because of the difficulties en-
countered in arresting indictees after indictments were made
public. 69 The public nature of the indictments informed many
indictees of their criminal status in the international commu-
nity and allowed many to evade capture. Countries who had a
self interest in aiding these men were facilitating their evasion
62 Id. at Rule 39.
63 See Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1999).
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See Simons, supra note 1, at A10.
69 See Arbour, supra note 3, at 39.
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and avoidance of prosecution. 70 Arbour, who is one of the major
figures in international law, clearly voiced her acceptance of
these means as a way to promote the capture of war criminals. 71
IV. THE PERMISSIVE ACCEPTANCE OF QUESTIONABLE
METHODS OF ATTAINING JURISDICTION IN
UNITED STATES LAw
An important problem arises when a person is located be-
yond the jurisdiction of the court issuing an indictment and is
not likely to voluntarily come into the area in which the court
has jurisdiction regardless of his knowledge of the indictment.
United States law and international law differ on what means
are acceptable to gain jurisdiction over an indictee. The stand-
ing principle of law in the United States regarding the manner
in which jurisdiction over an indictee can be achieved is re-
ferred to as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 72
This doctrine states that a court may assert jurisdiction
over an indictee regardless of the manner in which his presence
in the jurisdiction of the court in which he was tried was at-
tained.73 This includes issuing an indictment even if the per-
son's presence in the jurisdiction was a result of his having been
abducted from another state. 74 The jurisdiction of a court is,
therefore, not impeded by the fact that the Federal Kidnapping
Act was disregarded in the capture of the indictee. 75 A court
can even assert its jurisdiction over an indictee who has been
"[illlegally carried, against his will, into the United States."76 If
during the course of an ensuing trial, an indictee is accorded all
the rights traditionally given to a defendant during the course
of the trial, he cannot invalidate its results by claiming that the
court did not have jurisdiction over his person because of the
method by which the court obtained jurisdiction over his per-
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See generally Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519 (1952); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
73 See generally Ker, 119 U.S. at 436.
74 See Beachem v. Attorney General of Missouri, 808 F.2d 1303, 1304 (8th Cir.
1987).
75 See Collins, 342 U.S. at 511-12.
76 Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
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son. 77 "Nothing in the Constitution requires a guilty person
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to
trial against his will."v7
This does not mean that the indictee cannot make a valid
complaint against the manner in which his presence was ob-
tained. If government officials were instrumental in obtaining
an unwilling indictee's presence in the jurisdiction in which his
indictment was issued through such means as abduction, the
indictee can file a complaint charging these officials with violat-
ing his right to Due Process contained in the fifth and four-
teenth amendments of the United States Constitution. An
indictee brought into the jurisdiction of a court by force can file
a section 1983 civil suit for deprivation of rights afforded him by
the Constitution-namely that of Due Process. 79 If the indictee
can show that the means used to acquire his involuntary pres-
ence in the court's jurisdiction resulted in physical injury, he is
entitled to collect damages.80 Under this statute, such an in-
dictee can receive nominal damages even if he cannot prove
that he received any actual injury.8 1
Even if he succeeds in proving that an abrogation of his due
process rights did, however, occur, the indictee will not be able
to use this as a means of avoiding a legitimate trial.8 2 Courts of
appeal have allowed lower courts to assert jurisdiction over an
indictee over whom jurisdiction was questionably obtained even
though they do not approve of the use of sordid methods of at-
taining jurisdiction.8 3 In the case of United States v. Matta-Bal-
lesteros, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's assertion of jurisdiction
over a defendant whose presence in the court's jurisdiction had
been attained through his kidnapping from Honduras. The de-
fendant was charged with violence in the aid of racketeering,
kidnapping a federal agent, and conspiring to kidnap a federal
agent.8 4 Some courts, possibly as a result of their sense of un-
77 See id.
78 Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522.
79 See Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 1980).
80 See id. at 764.
81 See id. .
82 See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886).
83 See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1995).
84 See id.
20011
13
PACE INT'L L. REV.
easiness in allowing illegal actions to result in convictions, have
modified the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to greater or lesser extents8 5
in cases in which government officials were involved in the mal-
feasance, which resulted in an indictee's unwilling presence in a
jurisdiction. Several courts developed and applied tests by
which they judged whether the means used to achieve jurisdic-
tion invalidated a resulting conviction. 6 The court deciding the
case of the United States v. Toscanino, determined that a new
test had to be developed which would embody the judicial sys-
tem's newly expanded view of the protection afforded an alleged
criminal.8 7 An earlier decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Rochin v. California, asserted that due pro-
cess protected not only a defendant's right to a fair trial but also
protected certain rights before and during arrest.88 The court
in Toscanino asserted that this expanded protection of due pro-
cess could not exist simultaneously with the lax approach taken
by the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and, therefore, that the doctrine
needed to be modified.8 9 This court decided that where jurisdic-
tion had been attained by "[tihe government's deliberate, un-
necessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's
constitutional rights" due process requires a court to divest it-
self of jurisdiction. 90 In Toscanino, an Italian citizen, charged
with conspiracy to bring narcotics into the United States, was
kidnapped, tortured and drugged by government officials, in an
effort to bring him back into the United States for trial.91 The
court held that the methods used to attain jurisdiction over the
defendant were of the type which could result in a dismissal of a
conviction, and that the defendant was entitled to a hearing to
decide if such remedial action should be taken.92
Other courts disagree with the Toscanino court's broad
modification of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. These courts argue
that the extension of due process protection only necessitates a
85 See generally United States v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2nd Cir. 1974); United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2nd Cir. 1974); Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754.
86 See id.
87 See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
88 See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
89 See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 270-71.
92 See id. at 275-76.
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more limited adjustment of the doctrine. The court in United
States v. Gengler, as the court in Toscanino had, asserted that
the method in which jurisdiction over a defendant is attained
could no longer be ignored when considering the validity of an
ensuing conviction. 93 The court in Gengler, however, held that
convictions resulting from trials in which jurisdiction over an
indictee had been achieved by "torture, brutality and similar
outrageous conduct" could no longer be upheld.94 Yet, the Geng-
ler court asserted that other irregularities would not invalidate
a conviction. 95 According to Gengler, Rochin v. California's ex-
tension of due process protection only protects people from gov-
ernment actions before and during arrest which "'offend the
cannons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples', 'shock the conscience' and
'offend a sense of justice."' 96
The "cannons of decency and fairness which express the no-
tions of justice of English-speaking peoples" 97 mentioned by the
Gengler court may have been the "jus cogen norms." "Jus cogen
norms" are ... preemptory international laws which enjoy the
highest status within customary international law and cannot
be preempted by treaties. 98 In other words, these laws appear
to be the universal truths that all civilized countries must ac-
cept and which cannot be circumvented by national law.99 An
example of such a jus cogens is the ban on extra-judicial killing
that is a "norm of international law so fundamental that it is
binding on all members of the world community."100
According to courts in the United States, the rights consti-
tuting these norms of international law are very limited. 10 1
They "[elncompass only such basic rights as the right not to be
murdered, tortured, or otherwise subjected to cruel, inhumane
or degrading punishment... and the right not to be arbitrarily
93 See United States v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2nd Cir. 1974).
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1995).
99 See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
100 Id.
101 See id.
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detained,"102 "genocide, and slavery."10 3 Together these rights
form the standard of human rights accepted by the world com-
munity.1 0 4 According to United States jurisprudence, abduction
does not "rise to the level of other jus cogens norms such as tor-
ture, murder, genocide, and slavery." 0 5
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the United States Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. 0 6 The Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction of a Mexican citizen, who
had been abducted from Mexico to the United States to stand
trial for crimes in connection with the abduction and murder of
a United States Drug Enforcement Administration special
agent and his pilot.10 7 This reaffirmation was particularly
strong since an extradition treaty exists between the United
States and Mexico.108 The existence of this treaty seemingly
supported the indictee's argument that the court issuing his
conviction did not have jurisdiction over his person because he
had not been properly extradited from Mexico in accordance
with the terms of the treaty.1 09 The Supreme Court held that if
a treaty did not expressly or implicitly prohibit prosecution of
those whose presence was obtained by means other than those
mentioned in its terms such prosecution could occur." 0 The
court concluded that since the treaty between the United States
and Mexico did not expressly or implicitly prohibit prosecution
of those whose presence was obtained by means other than
those mentioned in its terms, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could be
applied, and under its terms the finding of jurisdiction would
stand.'1
Although the use of deception as a means for the acquisi-
tion of an individual's presence is not acceptable in civil cases" 2
102 Id.
103 Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
104 See id.
105 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentinia, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir.
1992).
106 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (9th Cir. 1992).
107 See generally id.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666.
111 See id. at 668.
112 See generally Tickle v. Barton, 95 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1956).
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it can be easily deduced from the United States' disregard for
the manner in which jurisdiction over an indictee is attained by
a court, formally expressed in the terms of the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine and reaffirmed in the Supreme Court's decision in Alva-
rez-Machain, that the courts in the United States would be
allowed to assert jurisdiction over indictees brought into their
jurisdiction by deception. Since United States' courts' jurisdic-
tion is not dependent on the manner in which it was attained,
the use of deception would not affect the assertion of jurisdic-
tion by a court. Moreover, if the courts do not consider the ab-
duction of an indictee, which can be asserted to be a more
serious infringement of the individual's rights than the use of
deception, they are not likely to consider any lesser infringe-
ment as a reason for denying a court jurisdiction over an
indictee.
Indeed, even the courts that attempted to modify the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine would not overturn a conviction on the grounds
that the indictee was lured into the jurisdiction in which he was
later convicted. The right to be free from the threat of abduc-
tion is not held by the United States as a "jus cogen norms" and,
therefore, is not beyond consideration for use in apprehending
an indictee. If abduction would be an acceptable means then it
stands to reason that deception would not "shock the con-
science" or be forbidden under "jus cogens norms."
V. THE MORE LIMITED, BUT STILL LIBERAL APPROACH
TOwARD ATTAINMENT OF JURISDICTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In contrast to United States law, international law is much
more favorable to the use of judicial scrutiny of the means used
to achieve jurisdiction than the United States and generally
condones the reversal of convictions by courts whose jurisdic-
tion was achieved through the use of dishonest tactics. 113
Therefore, it appears, that international law, generally, does
not approve of the United States' use of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
since it allows for jurisdiction in cases where there has been an
abduction or where some other questionable means have been
113 See generally Wilske, supra note 12.
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used to achieve jurisdiction over a defendant.114 Customary in-
ternational law must be relied upon in an effort to ascertain in-
ternational law's approach to such a situation.115 This type of
law, which in the past was frequently referred to as the law of
nations, is the result of the general assent of civilized na-
tions. 116 "The norms of [the] law of nations are found by con-
sulting [the] juridical writing on public law, considering the
general practice of nations, and referring to judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing international law."117 Diplomatic pa-
pers, such as statements, press releases, declarations and acts,
as well as the practice of international organizations can also be
used as sources for customary international law.118
A review of documents related to international law reveals
the existence of a dislike, common to the international commu-
nity, of some methods of attaining jurisdiction powerful enough
to affect the validity of convictions attained through the use of
such means. The Restatement Third of Foreign Relations
states that an abductee must be returned to the nation from
which he was abducted if his abduction was the result of one
nation's invasion of the sovereignty of another.119 The United
Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States require nations to honor the sovereignty that nations
have over their territory and the people found within their terri-
tory. 120 One of the most important rules of international law is
that every country is sovereign within its borders and that one
state may not exercise its power in another state by extracting a
person found within the first state's borders without the first
state's permission. 121 Inter-state abductions are contrary to a
basic tenent of international law.122 Abductions of people from
the territory of one state by agents of another state are con-
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
117 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
118 See Wilske, supra note 12, at 212.
119 See Leigh Ann Kennedy, Jurisdiction in Violation of an Extradition Treaty:
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1105, 1120 (1994).
120 See id.
121 See Jonathan A. Gluck, The Customary International Law of State-Spon-
sored International Abduction and the United States Courts, 44 DuKE L. J. 612,
614 (1994).
122 See id.
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demned by the international community, in large measure be-
cause they violate the sovereignty of the state from which the
person is snatched. 123 The international community also con-
siders the right to be free from abduction as one of the rights
constituting customary international law. 124 The Restatement
Third of Foreign Relations, the United Nations Charter and the
Charter of the Organization of American States, all clearly sug-
gest that international law does not support a court's jurisdic-
tion regardless of the means by which it was achieved.
125
When the holding of foreign courts are scrutinized, it be-
comes clear that they, as a whole, no longer adhere to the prin-
ciple of "male captus, bene detentus", which means "improperly
captured, properly detained." This rule had the same effect on
foreign courts' jurisdiction as the United States' Ker-Frisbie
doctrine had on courts in the United States. 126 Under the terms
of "male captus, bene detentus," a court could maintain jurisdic-
tion over a person regardless of the manner in which such juris-
diction was attained. 127
Courts throughout the world only recently ceased following
the doctrine of "male captus, bene detentus." Courts in
Zimbabwe began to overrule cases supporting the use of "male
captus, bene detentus" in 1992.128 Similarly, South African
courts had followed the doctrine until they suddenly reversed
themselves in the holding in State v. Ebrahim.129 Courts in
both these countries are now strictly prohibited from asserting
jurisdiction over a defendant whose presence in the court's ju-
risdiction was a result of malfeasance. 130 Courts in Costa Rica
must investigate any contention that jurisdiction was improp-
erly attained and can no longer assert jurisdiction over a defen-
dant if the defendant can prove his presence in the presiding
court's jurisdiction was a result of an abduction by Federal
agents. 131
123 See Kennedy, supra note 118, at 1120.
124 See Gluck, supra note 120.
125 See Kennedy, supra note 118, at 1120-21.
126 See generally Wilske, supra note 12.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 221.
129 See id. at 219-20.
130 See id. at 220-21.
131 See id. at 228.
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England also adhered in the past to the principle of "male
captus, bene detentus." An English court held "the strict view
that pre-trial police malpractice could generally have no effect
on (a) trial".132 Recently, however, there has been a move
within England to take a more active interest in police conduct
before trial. 133 Courts throughout England now frequently re-
move jurisdiction from lower courts when the method with
which the presence of a defendant was acquired is
questionable. '14
France, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia all allow
their courts to investigate the methods that were used when a
defendant was apprehended in a foreign jurisdiction. 135 All four
countries allow a court to dismiss a case or a conviction if a
court attained jurisdiction through questionable means. 136
Courts in these countries need not do so, however, if they do not
believe that the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case would of-
fend justice.137 In any of these countries, even those that pro-
hibit the exercise of jurisdiction over abductees, a court can
maintain jurisdiction if the abductee is an international war
criminal.138
Common sense suggests that the international commu-
nity's willingness to make an exception to its general opposition
to the attainment of jurisdiction through the use of questionable
means such as abduction would allow them to accept the use of
deception as a means of procuring jurisdiction over an indictee.
Although abduction and deception, when used against an indi-
vidual in order to induce him into taking certain actions are
both invasions of an individual's rights, it can easily be asserted
that abduction of a person is a more serious violation of rights
than is the use of deception. If the international community ac-
cepts the use of physical force involved in the abduction of cer-
tain international indictees it would be very hard for them to
take offense to the use of deception as a means of acquiring ju-
132 Andrew L.T Choo, Ex Parte Bennett: The Demise of the Male Captus, Bene
Detentus Doctrine in England?, 5 CRIM. L. F. 165 (1994).
133 See id. at 179.
134 See id.
135 See Wilske, supra note 12, at 222-28.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 230.
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risdiction over such an individual. As a result, it can be as-
serted with some assurance that the international community's
recent retreat from the principle of "male captus, bene deten-
tus" would not affect the jurisdiction of an international court
over an indictee of international stature who has been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by deception.
VI. CONCLUSION
After an investigation of the acceptability of the use of se-
cret indictment procedures and indictments as well as the use
of deception as a means of acquiring jurisdiction over an in-
dictee, it appears that the ICTY's use of these methods, as part
of an effort to bring General Momir Talic to trial for the war
crimes he is alleged to have committed as the chief of staff of the
Bosnian Serb army are acceptable under both United States
law and international law. General Talic was purposefully kept
ignorant of his indictment by the secrecy in which the indict-
ment proceeding was held, and the ICTY's decision not to dis-
close the existence of the indictment does not violate any
tenants of United States law. In fact, such tactics, if necessary
for the proper functioning of a Grand Jury or the apprehension
of an indictee, are legally sanctioned by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 139 Based on the ICTY's failure to capture
many of the Yugoslavian leaders suspected of war crimes, after
it had made public their indictments, 140 one can see that se-
crecy was an essential element in the capture of General Talic
and, therefore, acceptable under United States law.
It can also be deduced from the terms of international docu-
ments such as the London Charter 141 and the Rwanda Resolu-
tion 142 that the international community, both inplicity and
explicitly, supports the use of secret indictment procedures and
secret indictments. Particularly relevant to General Talic's sit-
uation is the fact that the international community, under the
terms of the Procedure and Evidence for the International Yu-
goslavia Tribunal, explicitly condones the use of secret indict-
ments and, by inference that of secret indictment procedures in
139 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(E)(4).
140 See Arbour, supra note 3, at 39.
141 London Agreement, supra note 40, at art. 16(a).
142 See ICTR Resolution, supra note 43.
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the arrest of suspected Yugoslavian war criminals. 143 There-
fore, it exemplifies that the international community clearly
gave its assent to the use of secrecy in the capture of General
Talic.
Moreover, the use of the invitation from the Vienna Na-
tional Defense Academy and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to attend a peace conference as the
means by which to secure the General's presence in Austria, a
country whose police would willingly execute the warrant for
arrest which arose from the indictment of General Talic, also
did not contradict either United States or international law.
Under the terms of United States law, known as the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, a court need not inquire into the manner in which an
indictee's presence in its jurisdiction occurred.144 Therefore, the
use of an invitation as bait to secure the presence of a criminal
suspect in the jurisdiction of the prosecuting court, even if inter-
preted as deceit and trickery, would not be taken into considera-
tion in deciding the validity of any ensuing prosecution.
Although the international community frequently no longer
follows the practice of the "improperly captured, properly de-
tained"145 it too would accept the use of the invitation to this
peace conference as an acceptable method with which to capture
a suspected and indicted war criminal. Even countries which
hold that their courts must inquire into the method by which
jurisdiction is acquired over an indictee if it is alleged that the
means used to capture the indictee are suspect would not deny
a court's jurisdiction over an indicted war criminal merely be-
cause he was induced to leave the sanctuary of his own country
and venture into another to attend a peace conference to which
he had been invited. The use of an invitation to capture a sus-
pected war criminal would probably be seen as a perfectly rea-
sonable tool in the effort to have justice done.
The assertion that the method used by the ITCY to arrest
General Talic is acceptable to both United States law and inter-
national law does not answer all the questions that the use of
such tactics produce. It does not answer the question whether
143 ICTY Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, at Rule 53.
144 See generally Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519 (1952); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
145 See generally Wilske, supra note 12.
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the combination of secretly indicting war criminals and then
luring them into a country where a warrant for their arrest can
easily be enforced is a wise method to use in the quest to appre-
hend war criminals. Although the international community
supports the use of this method, deception and trickery should
not be used as a means of acquiring jurisdiction. One need only
reflect on the horrendous effect that a general employment of
secret indictments and fictitious invitations could have on fu-
ture peace talks between, for instance, the Israelis and the
Palestinians. What new developments in peace negotiations be-
tween these two peoples could be stifled if Mr. Arafat thought
that he might be the target of a secret indictment, due to his
ties with terrorist factions, which could result in his arrest, if he
were to attend a peace conference happening outside of the Pal-
estinian territory?
Moreover, the international community should refrain from
any feeling that it has found the solution to the Gordian knot.
Although it succeeded in capturing a major Yugoslavian war
criminal through the combination of secret indictment and false
pretense it does not seem likely now that many major Yugoslav-
ian suspected war criminals will be as careless as to venture out
of their home territory for such unimportant business. The ef-
fectiveness of the use of secret indictments will probably slowly
fade as the likely targets of such indictments take greater cau-
tion to avoid capture, regardless of their actual knowledge of
their having been indicted by a war crimes tribunal. The con-
tinued success of such tactics is dependent on the carelessness,
ill-preparedness, or stupidity of an indictee, and if there is one
thing which can be generally asserted about suspected war
criminals it is that they are evil but generally not stupid.
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